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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, an anti-abortion judge garnered national attention
when the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld his decision to deny a
pregnant foster youth access to an abortion.1 Known as Anony-
mous 5, the sixteen-year-old petitioner sought a judicial bypass of
† J.D. Candidate ‘15, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law; M.A.
Ethics & Society ‘12, Fordham University; B.A. ‘09, Seattle University. Ms. Wallis
thanks Professor Ruthann Robson, Professor Andrea McArdle, Professor Ann Cam-
mett for their invaluable feedback and support; the Board and staff of CUNY Law
Review for their tireless efforts to support social justice scholarship; and special thanks
to National Advocates for Pregnant Women and associates, including Professor
Jeanne Flavin, Lynn Paltrow, Farah Diaz-Tello, Laura Huss, Kylee Sunderlin, Emma
Ketteringham, and Katherine McCabe for their unlimited compassion and resilience
in the face of struggle.
1 In re Petition of Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Neb. 2013); George Chidi,
Nebraska Supreme Court rules 16-year-old ‘not mature enough’ for abortion, THE RAW STORY
(October 5, 2013), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/10/05/nebraska/ (“The dis-
trict court judge, Peter C. Batallion, appears to have served in the 1980s on the com-
119
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the Nebraska law that requires a minor to obtain parental consent
before accessing abortion services.2 At a confidential hearing, she
told the judge that she was not in a position to financially support a
child and that she could not “be the right mom that [she] would
like to be right now.”3 She also testified that her foster parents
might resent her and her child because of their strong religious
beliefs about sexuality and abortion.4 She worried they would tell
her young siblings, her only biological family left, that she was a
“bad person.”5 She indicated she and her child might become
homeless if she were required to tell her conservative foster parents
about her pregnancy.6
In response to these concerns, the judge asked Anonymous 5
if she would rather “kill the child inside [her]” than “risk problems
with the foster care people,”7 and ultimately denied her request,
ruling she was “not sufficiently mature and well-informed” to
choose on her own to end her pregnancy.8  On appeal, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court upheld the ruling, a decision that incurred
a plethora of public comment.9 Many critics poignantly empha-
sized that finding a minor too immature for an abortion simultane-
mittee for Metro Right to Life, an Omaha anti-abortion group, the Houston Chronicle
reported.”).





7 Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d at 231.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Hilary Hanson, Nebraska Court Rules Teen Too Immature for Abortion, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/09/teen-too-
immature-abortion_n_4072321.html; Nina Liss-Schultz, Nebraska Court Decides 16-Year-
Old Is Too Immature for an Abortion, But Motherhood’s Okay, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 8,
2013), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/10/parental-consent-laws-nebraska
-abortion-courts (describing the Anonymous 5 court as “essentially finding [the minor]
mature enough to carry a baby she doesn’t want but too immature to consent to her
own abortion”); Katy Waldman, Nebraska Court Rules Teen Too Immature for an Abortion,
Fine to Raise a Kid, SLATE (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/
2013/10/07/nebraska_supreme_court_rules_that_a_16_year_old_in_foster_care_is
_not_mature.html (“The Nebraska Supreme Court denied a 16-year-old foster child’s
request for an abortion on Friday because she was ‘not sufficiently mature’ to make
the decision herself. So instead, this immature young woman who does not want a
baby will become a mother. Everyone wins.”); Dan Arel, Nebraska Court Rules 16-year-old
Girl not Mature Enough for Abortion, EXAMINER (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.examiner
.com/article/nebraska-court-rules-16-year-old-girl-not-mature-enough-for-abortion
(“A 16-year-old Nebraskan girl who had to petition the Nebraska Supreme Court for
her federally protected right to an abortion was denied when the judge ruled she was
not mature enough to have an abortion. Oddly enough, they believe she is mature
enough to be a mother.”).
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ously deems her mature enough to parent.10 Across news sites,
reporters began stories with quips highlighting this paradox, in-
cluding Slate’s article Nebraska Court Rules Teen Too Immature for an
Abortion, Fine to Raise a Kid.11
Although clever, the headline seriously understates the ex-
traordinary barriers to reproductive justice that pregnant and
parenting foster youth face. When a foster minor like Anonymous
5 is denied access to abortion, she may also be unable to parent her
child because of the significant rate of state removal of children
from mothers in foster care.12 As a result, for many pregnant and
parenting youth in foster care, the quip horrifyingly becomes “too
immature for an abortion and too immature for motherhood.”13
Across the reproductive spectrum, the state fails to provide fos-
ter youth with the resources, rights, and support necessary to
choose whether to get pregnant, give birth, or parent a child.14 At
the start, without access to adequate sex education and reproduc-
tive health services, a foster minor may lack real autonomy in
choosing to become pregnant and carry her pregnancy to term.
Upon giving birth, she may be coerced into adoption by a
caseworker or foster parents who do not wish to accommodate the
newborn. If she retains custody, the new parent may likely also face
accusations of abuse or neglect in a defective child welfare system
inundated with systemic prejudice against the poor that consist-
ently fails to provide for its wards.15 As a result of system failure, a
disadvantaged mother in foster care, who very likely did not have
much choice in becoming a parent, might also face such lack of
10 See sources cited supra note 9.
11 Waldman, supra note 9.
12 WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., PREGNANT AND PARENTING YOUTH
IN FOSTER CARE IN WASH. STATE: COMPARISON TO OTHER TEENS AND YOUNG WOMEN
WHO GAVE BIRTH 10 (2014), available at http://www.dshs.wa.gov/pdf/ms/rda/re
search/11/202.pdf (finding that the “rate of out of home placement for children
born to Foster Youth (7%) was more than 10 times higher than the rates for Medicaid
Teens (0.5%) and Medicaid Young Adults (0.6%) and nearly 25 times higher than the
rate for Non-Medicaid Teens (0.3%)”); Amy Dworsky & Jan DeCoursey, Pregnant and
Parenting Foster Youth: Their Needs, Their Experiences, CHAPIN HALL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO 34 (2009), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/
Pregnant_Foster_Youth_final_081109.pdf (finding that of the population of foster
youth mothers they surveyed, “11 percent had a child placed in foster care”).
13 Jennifer Blasdell, Mother May I?: Ramifications for Parental Involvement Laws for
Minors Seeking Abortion Services, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 300 (2002).
14 See generally SCHUYLER CENTER FOR ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY, Risking Their Future:
Understanding the Health Behaviors of Foster Youth, (2009), available at http://www.scaany
.org/resources/documents/risking_their_future_report_000.pdf.
15 See Eve Stotland & Cynthia Godsoe, The Legal Status of Pregnant and Parenting
Youth in Foster Care, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 25 (2006).
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choice in remaining one.16
This comment tracks the reproductive life course of a foster
youth and the various legal and policy-based obstacles she may
face, beginning with pre-pregnancy and entry into foster care, and
ending with state removal of children.17 Part I provides an overview
of the child welfare system and its failure to achieve the goals upon
which it is premised. Part II generally discusses the regulatory
scheme and the role of increasing privatization in denying foster
youth adequate sex education and reproductive health services.
Part III focuses on judicial bypass as applied to foster youth, which
creates legal absurdities and significant risks to minors’ health and
safety. Part IV discusses risks that a pregnant or parenting foster
youth faces: lack of prenatal care, unwarranted scrutiny and judg-
ment, and a high risk of state removal of her child—not because of
conventional understandings of abuse or neglect, but because the
state fails to provide her the resources to parent. Finally, Part V
recommends various practical interventions to improve outcomes
for foster youth, including major shifts in the way the system ap-
proaches child welfare, teen sexuality, and reproductive health.18
I. ENTERING THE SYSTEM: THE CHILD WELFARE LEGAL SCHEME
To begin, this section analyzes the legal scheme of the child
welfare system, focusing on how youth end up in state care. Family
law is typically decided by each state.19 But when it comes to child
welfare, each state conforms to federal requirements in order to
receive funding for its child welfare system. In 1996, these federal
requirements underwent an extreme revision, changing the focus
from keeping youth in their communities to a more “child protec-
tive” stance, purportedly designed to protect minors from harm
and promoting adoption as a means of securing stable placements
16 See id. at 2.
17 This comment assumes the following definition of reproductive justice: “Repro-
ductive justice will exist when all people can exercise the rights and access the re-
sources they need to thrive and to decide whether, when, and how to have and parent
children with dignity, free from discrimination, coercion, or violence.” LAW STUDENTS
FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, Motivation (2013), available at http://lsrj.org/motivation/.
18 Recognizing the importance of language, this comment uses “children” when
discussing the private familial context, “minors” when referring to the legal system,
and “youth” when referencing greater social concerns regarding the population in
foster care.
19 “‘[R]egulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an area that has long been regarded as
a virtually exclusive province of the States.’” United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675,
2680 (2013) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-1\CNY104.txt unknown Seq: 5 30-APR-15 15:04
2014] NO ACCESS, NO CHOICE 123
in families.20
Known as the Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), the
law was designed to secure “permanency” for a foster minor by pro-
moting adoption rather than reunification with the family of ori-
gin.21 Signed into law by then-President Clinton, the legislation was
a response to high-profile child abuse cases making national news
because of their horrific facts and child deaths.22 Sadly, these news
stories produced an erroneous concern that agencies were reuni-
fying families at the expense of child safety,23 when in fact, most of
those tragedies were a result of administrative failure, not because
an agency prioritized family unity over removal of a child.24
For instance, J.W. was a child who died in his mother’s care
while an agency was investigating her for abuse.25 The tragedy
made national news with legislators framing it as a “casualty of the
federal law.”26 Backers of ASFA used the death to say the old law
required the agency to make too many efforts to keep families to-
gether at the expense of children’s safety.27 In reality, however,
J.W. remained in the home because the agency lost his records, not
because the law required the agency to keep him with his
mother.28 Regardless, politicians used such high-profile tragedies
to pass ASFA—an agency now only needs to make reasonable ef-
forts (as opposed to the previous “diligent efforts”) to keep families
together.29
Consequently, more children are unnecessarily removed from
their families and placed into stranger foster care because of pov-
erty-related issues rather than intentional maltreatment that is typi-
cally associated with abuse and neglect.30 With legal neglect
20 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21 Id. § 305(b)(2) (limiting family reunification to a “15-month period” beginning
“on the date that the child, pursuant to section 475(5)(F), is considered to have en-
tered foster care”).
22 See Will Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under
Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 273-74 (2003).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 274.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 Crossley, supra note 22, at 274.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 271-74; In order for an agency to show substantial conformity with federal
law to determine eligibility for federal funding, it must achieve the outcome that
“children are, first and foremost, protected from abuse and neglect [and] children
are safely maintained in their own homes whenever possible and appropriate.” 45
C.F.R. § 1355.34(b)(1)(i).
30 Ann Cammett, Introduction to The Rights of Parents with Children in Foster Care:
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making up more than seventy five percent of child welfare investi-
gations,31 a state’s safety concern that justifies removal of a child is
often more closely linked to poverty than to someone being a “bad
parent.”32
For example, an agency may include in the basis for removing
a child that the mother has too much take-out and fast food in the
refrigerator despite lack of local access to affordable healthy gro-
ceries; or for her not visiting the child enough in the hospital de-
spite her inability to pay for transportation; or for her son’s truancy
from school while she balances two full-time jobs.33 Relying on
high-profile abuse cases for its passage, ASFA made it easier for an
agency to take away a parent’s custody of her child, rather than
address the underlying socioeconomic causes of the problem, be-
cause of the reduced efforts required by the agency to keep the
family intact.
Similarly, horror stories about minors languishing in the foster
care system resulted in a push for adoption over traditional family
unity.34 Federal law now requires states to file a petition to termi-
nate a parent’s rights when her child has been in state custody for
fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, or if the parent com-
mits a certain crime against the minor.35 ASFA also includes that
for every successful termination of parental rights and adoption of
Removals Arising from Economic Hardship and the Predicative Power of Race Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, 6 N.Y. CITY L.REV. 61, 62 (2003) (“The policy directive,
absorbed and implemented by agency officials and caseworkers alike, is crudely re-
ferred to as ‘when in doubt, yank them out.’ As a practical matter, the agency failed to
make a distinction between cases of child abuse and severe parental neglect—which
constitute a small percentage of indicated cases—and child neglect arising from
poverty.”).
31 Michelle Healy, Child Neglect Accounts for 75% of Reported Abuse Cases, USA TODAY
(Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/12/child-
abuse-neglect/2803099/.
32 See Cammett, supra note 30; Emma Ketteringham, Lighting a Candle is Not Abuse,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emma-s-ketter
ingham/lighting-a-candle-is-not-_b_4349689.html; Nanette Schorr, Foster Care and the
Politics of Compassion, TIKKUN, May 1992, 118-121 available at http://www.spiritlaw
politics.org/sites/default/files/Foster-Care-And-Politics-Of-Compassion.pdf.
33 Examples based on cases the author witnessed while observing abuse and neg-
lect proceedings in Bronx County Family Court during Summer of 2013, and Brook-
lyn County Family Court in Fall of 2014. See also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 26-29 (2002); Kamala D. Harris, In School On
Track: Attorney General’s 2013 Report on California’s Elementary School Truancy & Absentee-
ism Crisis, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL (2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/tru
ancy/2013/ch5.
34 Crossley, supra note 22, at 271-273.
35 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-163 (excluding P.L.
113-128)).
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a minor, foster care agencies receive a substantial financial re-
ward.36 So, while an agency is responsible for making reasonable
efforts to reunify a child with her parent, that same agency also has
major financial incentive to see the minor remain in care so that
the parent’s rights are terminated and the minor is successfully
adopted.37 The financial incentives have been touted as successes,
with the prerogative given to adoption rather than a minor’s re-
turn to her parents or community, regardless of the context in
which she entered or remained in state care.38
When a state has jurisdiction over a minor, because she is in
care or otherwise, a court must hold a yearly hearing.39 During this
hearing, a court decides her permanent living arrangement, deter-
mining a range of issues such as: (1) whether the child should re-
turn to her parents; (2) whether parents’ rights should be
terminated and the minor placed for adoption; (3) whether an-
other person should obtain legal guardianship; or (4) whether the
child should be placed with a family member or in another ar-
rangement that is in the minor’s best interests.40
After the court determines the minor’s permanency plan, the
agency must make reasonable efforts towards this end.41 States de-
termine whether to prioritize children being placed with family
members because no priority is given in ASFA. However, even
when kinship care is prioritized by statute, a low-income or non-
traditional family member will likely not meet the arduous require-
ments of a “fit and willing relative,” and the minor will be placed in
stranger foster care.42
For example, New York City denies family member requests to
foster their kin because of arbitrary rules regarding the family’s
36 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, supra note 20; How the Adoption Incen-
tives Program can Incentivize Adoptions, CONG. COAL. ON ADOPTION INST. (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://ccainstituteblog.org/2013/02/27/how-the-adoption-incentive-program-can-in
centivise-adoptions/ (“Originally created in 1997 as part of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act, the Adoption Incentives Program has delivered a total of $375 million in
bonuses to states that were successful in increasing the number of children adopted
out of foster care.”).
37 See Crossley, supra note 22, at 271-73; Schorr, supra note 32, at 120 (“Now, foster
parents and foster care administrators have an economic incentive to perpetuate the
institutionalized practice of child removal and placement.”).
38 CONG. COAL. ON ADOPTION INST., supra note 36.
39 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, supra note 20.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(1)(E) (West 2011); Cammett, supra note 30; See also Katherine
Moore, Pregnant In Foster Care: Prenatal Care, Abortion, And The Consequences For Foster
Families, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 33-36 (2012).
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home. Low-income families might only have one- or two-bedroom
apartments, but to foster their nieces, nephews, or grandchildren,
families must have separate bedrooms for opposite sex children
over seven years old.43 No more than three people can occupy a
bedroom where children sleep.44 An adult may not sleep in the
same room with a child of the opposite sex who is over the age of
three.45 No child may sleep in the same bed as an adult, even if that
adult is her grandmother.46  Additional rules require all members
in the household to undergo intensive background checks.47 The
home will be denied foster care status because of someone’s stale
criminal conviction or an abuse or neglect registry report, even if a
court has found the report unsubstantiated or that such a history
would not pose any risk to the child.48 For families living in pov-
erty, these requirements can be impossible to meet.
When in stranger foster care, minors may still enjoy visits with
their parents, who often maintain significant legal rights to parent
their children.49 But for low-income parents, visitation is often diffi-
cult to maintain because of agencies’ inflexible visitation hours and
low standard of accommodation for work conflicts, transportation,
or other special needs. A parent might also struggle to complete
the time-consuming regime of services mandated by the court.
These unwanted and unhelpful programs are typically not tailored
to meet the parent’s individual needs and can instead be overly
burdensome and negatively impact the family unit as a whole.50
Indeed, the current system “substitutes costly, poorly tailored
interventions—few of which have been shown to improve the care
of children—for systemic and lasting investment in our poor com-





48 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 443.3(a).
49 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evap-
orate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary cus-
tody of their child to the State”); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 821 (1977); see, e.g., In re Lyle A., 14 Misc. 3d 842, 850 (Fam.
Ct. 2006) (“A parent whose child is in foster care has the right to make the decision
regarding whether or not his or her child will be given psychotropic drugs.”).
50 See Schorr, supra note 32. A court may not exercise jurisdictional control over a
parent until after a trial and finding of abuse or neglect. However, even without a
finding of abuse or neglect, a parent often must participate in court-mandated ser-
vices to enjoy visits with her child, and to show a willingness to cooperate with the
court.
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munities.”51 For example, the court typically assigns all parents ac-
cused of abuse and neglect to parenting classes. But the support a
fifteen-year-old parenting foster minor needs is much different
from what a forty-five-year-old mother of four needs—yet the two
are assigned to the same two-hour mandatory parenting skills lec-
ture.52 For allegations involving drug or alcohol use, burdensome
programs may be mandatory, even when such programs are inef-
fective and non-responsive to the individual’s needs or supposed
risk to the minor.53
Additionally, overworked and undertrained caseworkers deter-
mine what “good” parenting is through subjective value judgments,
often colored by prejudice and cultural assumptions. Take, for ex-
ample, a mother’s plight recently profiled by The New Yorker—a
caseworker took an Egyptian mother’s shyness for shiftiness and
mysteriousness, ultimately forbidding her from speaking in Arabic
to her son.54 A caseworker’s prejudice and bias often shape the
standard for what is deemed acceptable parenting and who is ulti-
mately accused of abuse and neglect.55 Such room for personal and
51 Leaving your children? Go to a parental skills class. No need to consider
that what you really need is some day-care assistance, or someone to
watch the little ones while you take the older children to the store or
the doctor or simply for a walk. You’ve sexually abused your child? Go to
a sex-offenders clinic, where you will get behavioral modification ther-
apy. No need to explore the physical or emotional violence you exper-
ienced as a child or your own lack of self-esteem and sense of alienation.
Abusing drugs or alcohol? Have your urine tested regularly and exercise
greater self-discipline. No need to say that you feel narcotics may be the
best thing going, given the conditions under which you’re living. This
does not mean that these behaviors should not be controlled; indeed,
they must be. But in the absence of a real commitment to addressing
the isolation and degradation from which abuse and neglect follow,
they will only continue.
Schorr, supra note 32, at 121; see also Ketteringham supra note 32.
52 Example from Judge Maria Arias, New York City Family Court, Kings County,
Panel Speaker at the City University of New York (CUNY) Law Students for Reproduc-
tive Justice Spring Panel: Youth, Gender, and Social Justice Lawyering in Family Court
(April 3, 2014).
53 Id.
54 Rachel Aviv, Where Is Your Mother?, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 2, 2013, at 52, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/02/where-is-your-mother.
55 ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 17 (“A national study of child protective services by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported that ‘minority children,
and in particular African American children, are more likely to be in foster care
placement than receive in-home services, even when they have the same problems and char-
acteristics as white children.’ . . . Government authorities appear to believe that maltreat-
ment of Black children results from pathologies intrinsic to their homes and that
helping them requires dislocating them from their families. Child welfare for Black
children usually means shattering the bonds with their parents.”).
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systemic biases partly accounts for the gross racial disproportional-
ity of children of color in the child welfare system and the dispa-
rate treatment they receive while in care.56
Federal law also sets the goals of the foster care programs.57 In
order to receive funding, an agency is evaluated on its ability to
meet various outcomes, including that the minors in its care re-
ceive appropriate educational, physical, and mental health ser-
vices.58 States, however, rarely actualize these goals, adversely
impacting for life the almost half a million youth in foster care; yet
states and the private independent agencies they contract with still
receive funding.59
Indeed, the growing trend of privatizing foster care agencies
has worsened the outcomes for foster youth—independent non-
governmental organizations are left alone to interpret and fulfill
the already-vague federal requirements for achieving the health
and well being of minors. This includes religious agencies that may
have other priorities or sectarian beliefs regarding what is best for
the minor. Of additional worry are agencies that function on a for-
profit model when they receive federal monies for every termina-
tion of parental rights and private monies for successful adoption
of a child—a model that commodifies children, rather than en-
courages entities to act in children’s best interests.60
Foster youth often find themselves separated from their com-
munities for the first time, heightening the high risks that minors
56 Id. at 16-25 (“Not only do Black children enter the system in disproportionate
numbers and for longer periods of time, but they also receive lower-quality services
once they get there.” “Black children are less likely than white children to either be
returned home or adopted.”).
57 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355, 1356, 1357 (2014).
58 The federal government tracks and measures state outcomes in relation to the
requirements set out in this highly complex and opaque funding scheme. 45 C.F.R.
§ 1355.34(b)(iii) (2012); Gail Chang Bohr, For the Well-Being of Minnesota’s Foster Chil-
dren: What Federal Legislation Requires, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 897, 899 (2005) (dis-
cussing 42 U.S.C. § 677 (2002)).
59 Ramesh Kasarabada, Fostering the Human Rights of Youth in Foster Care: Defining
Reasonable Efforts To Improve Consequences of Aging Out, 17 CUNY L. REV. 145, 151-157
(2013); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
THE AFCRS REPORT (July 2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/
files/cb/afcarsreport19.pdf.
60 See Crossley, supra note 22, at 271-73; For a background on problems associated
with privatizing traditional government functions and the for-profit functioning of
non-profits, see James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 303, 306 (2006) (“Nonprofits are far from independent of private enterprise or
government. There is an extraordinary degree of interface between government and
nonprofits today. Nonprofits mimic for-profit firms, and the private sector plays an
enormous role in the nonprofit sector. Many nonprofits engage substantially, if not
excessively, in regular business activity.”).
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in foster care already face. For example, as compared to their
peers, foster care youth are more likely to drop out of high
school,61 face homelessness,62 get inconsistent health care (if
any),63 and experience trauma, including the trauma of being sep-
arated from their parents.64 Foster youth also have increased rates
of incarceration and interaction with the juvenile criminal sys-
tem,65 repeated pregnancy,66 teen parenting,67 joblessness,68 and
extreme poverty.69
Already disadvantaged by the system, foster care youth then
face complete abandonment when they “age out” of the system.70
Federal law requires an agency to plan for supporting youth as they
transition out of care.71 However, the plan requirement is vague
61 Dworsky & Decoursey, supra note 12, at 34 (“[F]oster youth were more likely to
drop out (or, in the case of males, become incarcerated) than to graduate.”).
62 Mark E. Courtney, et. al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former
Foster Youth: Outcomes at age 23 and 24, CHAPIN HILL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 10
2010, available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/Midwest_Study_Age_
23_24.pdf.
63 Id.
64 COMMITTEE ON EARLY CHILDHOOD, ADOPTION, AND DEPENDENT CARE, Health Care
of Young Children in Foster Care, 109 PEDIATRICS 536, 539 (2002), available at http://
pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/109/3/536.full.pdfťml (“Certainly, even brief
separation from parental care is an unfortunate and usually traumatic event for chil-
dren.”); Karen Baynes-Dunning & Karen Worthington, Responding to the Needs of
Adolescent Girls in Foster Care, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 321, 343 (2013)
(describing “the emotional trauma that is caused simply by a family’s involvement
with the child welfare system.”).
65 Children in child welfare systems are at a higher risk of involvement with the
juvenile criminal justice system as compared to their peers. The reasons for this vary,
but include the fact that children in the child welfare system are often low-income
and of color, making them a target for the criminal justice system. Additionally, child
welfare agencies will often report the youth in their custody for various crimes. The
rate of interaction between these two systems is incredibly apparent such that one
advocate recommends that agencies, in addition to making the legally required rea-
sonable efforts to reunite families, should make reasonable efforts to keep children in
their care from becoming targets of the juvenile criminal justice system, which would
include not reporting on their wards to law enforcement. Baynes-Dunning & Worth-
ington, supra note 64 at 325; Claudette Brown, Crossing over: From Child Welfare to Juve-
nile Justice, MD. BAR J. 22, 18 (2003).
66 Dworsky & Decoursey, supra note 12 at 33.
67 Id.
68 Kasarabada, supra note 59.
69 Id.
70 Id. Each state varies on how long a youth can remain in foster care, typically
ranging between eighteen and twenty-one years old, with some states allowing longer
periods when the youth is employed or enrolled in school.
71 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(H) (During the ninety-days before the child ends care, “ a
caseworker on the staff of the State agency, and, as appropriate, other representatives
of the child provide the child with assistance and support in developing a transition
plan that is personalized at the direction of the child, includes specific options on
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and the agency is not required to take steps to actually implement
the plan or provide the minor with support.72 This leaves the mi-
nor virtually alone and without any resources, exacerbating the dis-
advantages she may already face.73 The state’s failure to provide for
foster youth as they age out is so egregious that it may likely violate
the basic tenets of human rights and various international laws.74
II. PREVENTING PREGNANCY: THE SYSTEM’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
SUPPORT AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES
The systemic failure of the state to provide for foster youth is
exemplified by a lack of pre-pregnancy education and access to re-
sources available to foster youth. Generally, American teens are un-
informed about sex, pregnancy, and pregnancy prevention
because of a national failure to educate our youth, partially result-
ing from state policies that place political and religious ideology
above the health, safety, and future of youth.75 Foster youth are
housing, health insurance, education, local opportunities for mentors and continuing
support services, and work force supports and employment services, includes informa-
tion about the importance of designating another individual to make health care
treatment decisions on behalf of the child if the child becomes unable to participate
in such decisions and the child does not have, or does not want, a relative who would
otherwise be authorized under State law to make such decisions, and provides the
child with the option to execute a health care power of attorney, health care proxy, or
other similar document recognized under State law, and is as detailed as the child
may elect.”).
72 Id.; Kasarabada, supra note 59.
73 Id.
74 Id. (Arguing that the state’s failure to provide for foster youth when they age out
violates the Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov, 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.).
75 American youth are undereducated and misinformed about sex, pregnancy,
and pregnancy prevention. Only twenty-two states plus the District of Columbia man-
date sex education. Of those states, only twelve of them require that information be
medically accurate. Additionally, the majority of states require that if sex education is
given, then abstinence from sex must be stressed or covered. The majority of states
have this policy, despite many studies proving that these models be ineffective, dan-
gerous for youth, and result in higher rates of unwanted teen pregnancy and Sexually
Transmitted Infections (STIs). The increase of the influence of religious ideologies in
state policies is partially responsible for the prevalence of these harmful policies. THE
NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, Magical Thinking:
Young Adults’ Attitudes and Beliefs about Sex, Conception, and Unplanned Pregnancy, Results
from a Public Opinion Survey (2008), available at http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/
resources/pdf/pubs/MagicalThinking.pdf; Sex and HIV Education, State Policies in Brief
as of November 1, 2013, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, 3-4 (2013) available at http://www.gutt
macher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SE.pdf; Policy Brief: Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage
Programs: Ineffective, Unethical, and Poor Public Health, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH (July
2007), available at http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/storage/advfy/documents/pba
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especially susceptible to under-education and misinformation
about sex and reproductive health and are more likely to get preg-
nant than their peers.76 Advocates attribute this to inconsistent ed-
ucation,77 frequent moving between placements, overloaded and
mismanaged agencies, and a lack of agency policies to adequately
educate foster youth.78
Indeed, despite federal goals to educate foster youth, many
child welfare workers and foster parents feel inadequately trained
to provide general sex education for foster youth.79 One study of
seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds in foster care found that only
forty-five percent were given information about pregnancy preven-
tion and only fifteen percent received information about family
planning services.80 Worsening the matter, foster youth also often
do not have access to traditional forms of sex education via family
and community sources, often assumed to be a primary source of
information about sex, reproduction, and pregnancy.81 Experts
conclude that lack of sex education is responsible for the high
bonly.pdf; John Santelli, Medical Accuracy in Sexuality Education: Ideology and the
Scientific Process, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1786, 1788-1791 (2008).
76 Why it Matters: Teen Pregnancy and Children Welfare, THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO
PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY (Aug. 2010), available at http://centerforchildwelfare2.
fmhi.usf.edu/kb/resource/ItsYourResponsibility.pdf (“Nearly three out of four
young women in foster care report being pregnant at age 21 compared to only one-
third of young women not in foster care. Repeat pregnancies are common with
almost two-thirds of the young women in foster care experiencing more than one
pregnancy by age 21,” citing COURTNEY, supra note 62).
77 Inconsistent education is compounded by a drastic increase of public schools
using suspension and expulsion as an institutional response to disciplinary and behav-
ioral problems; such policies often disproportionally impact foster youth. Brown,
supra note 65, at 22 (“Disciplinary problems in school resulting in suspension or ex-
pulsion have increased dramatically in the U.S., from 1.7 million in 1974 to 3.1 mil-
lion in 1997.”).
78 Taylor Dudley, Bearing Injustice: Foster Care, Pregnancy Prevention, and the Law, 28
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 77, 110–112 (2013); Amy Sullivan, Teen Pregnancy: An
Epidemic in Foster Care, TIME MAG., (July 22, 2009) (“‘You’re so busy being transferred
from home to home,’ says Alixes Rosado, who has been in foster care in Connecticut
since he was 6 years old. ‘You don’t have a lot of stable connections.’ The 20-year-old
estimates that he has worked with a different social worker every year for the past 10.
‘And not a single one talked about sex’.”).
79 Heather Boonstra, Teen Pregnancy Among Young Women In Foster Care: A
Primer, 14 n.2 Guttmacher Policy Review 12 (Spring 2011), available at http://
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/14/2/gpr140208.html#9.
80 Amy Dworsky, Research Fellow, Chapin Hall, Remarks for a Congressional
Roundtable with Senator Mary Landrieu at the Russell Senate Office Building:
Preventing Pregnancy among Youth in Foster Care (July 16, 2009) available at http://
www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/DworskyFosterPregnancy-7-16-09.pdf.
81 Sullivan, supra note 78 (“Perhaps the most important asset teenagers need to
avoid early parenthood is a strong relationship with parents or other adults in their
lives.”); see also Baynes-Dunning & Worthington, supra note 64, at 341.
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rates of teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (STIs)
among foster youth.82
Even when foster care youth do receive education about sex
and pregnancy prevention, it is often “too little, too late.”83 Youth
misunderstand how to effectively protect themselves,84 because of
prevalent misinformation and stigma surrounding sex and repro-
ductive health.85 Such misinformation and stigma are often a result
of the widespread use of ineffective and unethical abstinence-only
models of sex education.86 Indeed, there are no standard guide-
lines for what constitutes adequate sex and reproductive health ed-
ucation, and private agencies, often sectarian in nature, are left to
their own judgment and expertise, or lack thereof.87
Equally problematic is that youth in foster care often do not
feel safe or even know whom to turn to for help if help were availa-
ble. Trepidation to approach a caseworker or foster parent may be
compounded by the agency’s or foster parent’s particular religious
orientation, whether or not that concern is founded. Alarmingly,
one study found that queer youth in foster care feel more comfort-
able being homeless than in foster care because of the agency’s or
foster parents’ private religious beliefs.88 Youth may have similar
fears of approaching the agency or foster parents with politically
charged problems like abortion or sexual health.
For example, in In re petition of Anonymous 5, the minor sought
a judicial bypass of the parental consent law out of fear that if her
foster parents found out about her pregnancy, then they would no
longer let her live there and would tell her siblings she was a “bad
person.”89 She feared that, if she carried her pregnancy to term,
her foster parents would “harbor resentment toward her” and that
“it would also be taken out on [her] child.”90 These concerns
82 Dworsky, supra note 80, at 2.
83 Id. at 3.
84 Id.
85 See THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, supra note 75.
86 ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Programs, supra note 75.
87 For example, one researcher found that foster care youth were not receiving
any education about sexually transmitted infections, despite receiving education
about birth control. Kym R. Ahrens, Laboratory Diagnosed Sexually Transmitted Infections
In Former Foster Youth Compared With Peers, 126 PEDIATRICS 97, 101 (2010).
88 Baynes-Dunning & Worthington, supra note 64, at 343; See Mimi Laver & Andrea
Khoury, Opening Doors For LGBTQ Youth In Foster Care: A Guide For Lawyers And
Judges, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 9 (2008), available at http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/2008_Openingdoors_Text.auth
checkdam.pdf.
89 In re Petition of Anonymous 5, 286 Neb. 226, 231 (2013).
90 Id.
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stemmed from her foster parents’ “strong religious beliefs about
abortion” and the obvious failure to create an environment of sup-
port in the placement.91
Unfortunately, Anonymous 5’s fears might be very common
given compounding factors, including the high rate of unplanned
pregnancies of foster care youth,92 a trend of privatizing foster care
without adequate government oversight,93 and no standard train-
ing for agency workers and foster parents.94 Many foster youth do
not feel comfortable approaching adults in their lives with ques-
tions or requests for help,95 and agencies and foster parents are
often ill-equipped and untrained to support a pregnant minor in
their care.96 Indeed, “child welfare workers feel unprepared to talk
with foster youth about sex and contraception,”97 and the lack of
policies leads to confusion on how to best help the minor.98
An additional risk to a minor’s health is that most agencies
suffer from poor care management because of frequent turnover,
extremely high caseloads,99 and a lack of adequate training for
staff.100 For example, in Pennsylvania in 2003, a foster care minor
was initially denied an abortion because agency staff were confused
about “whether the department would pay for the procedure.”101
Delays like this could put a minor at risk for missing crucial steps to
91 Id.
92 Sullivan, supra note 78 (labeling the rate of teen pregnancy in foster care as an
“epidemic” and citing a University of Chicago study that “found that nearly half of
girls who had spent time in the foster-care system had been pregnant at least once by
the time they were 19 years old”).
93 Madelyn Freundlich & Sarah Gerstenzang, Privatization of Child Welfare Services:
Challenges and Successes Executive Summary, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (last accessed December
2, 2014), available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/
privatization_of_child_welfare_services_exec_sum.pdf.
94 Baynes-Dunning & Worthington, supra note 64, at 343-344.
95 Dworsky, supra note 80, at 2-3.
96 Moore, supra note 42, at 52-55 (surveying several policies that either do not
address or minimally address pregnant youth).
97 Other adults in a minor’s life also do not get the training necessary to speak
with youth about pregnancy prevention, including how to create an atmosphere
where the minor feels comfortable approaching them with questions or requests for
help. Dworsky, supra note 80, at 2-3.
98 Moore, supra note 42, at 52-55 (surveying several policies that either do not
address or minimally address pregnant youth).
99 Dudley, supra note 78, at 92 (the recommended number of cases is twelve to
fifteen, while many places expect caseworkers “to handle upwards of fifty cases”);
NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS, CASE MGMT. STANDARDS WORK GRP. . NASW Standards
for Social Work Case Management (June 1992), www.naswdc.org/practice/standards/sw_
case_mgmt.asp#9.
100 Dudley, supra note 78, at 92.
101 In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d 714, 715 (2003).
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securing a legal abortion.102 Lack of policies and case mismanage-
ment such as this often cause foster youth to be overlooked and to
not receive access to needed health services.103
As privatization of foster care increases, an agency also may
have its own agenda as to what constitutes appropriate reproduc-
tive health care, regardless of objective medical standards.
Caseworkers and foster parents may conscientiously object to pro-
viding a minor with information and resources about abortion and
pregnancy prevention, even if there are policies in place,104 be-
cause these private agencies likely receive little oversight from the
government departments with whom they contract.105 As one
scholar notes, an agency may “provid[e] as much as or as little help
as they see fit”106 to a pregnant minor, which may include a referral
to deceptive crisis pregnancy centers.
In New York City, for example, foster care is predominantly
privatized—rather than the City providing foster care services di-
rectly, it contracts with over thirty non-profit agencies, many of
which are religiously affiliated.107 In the 1980s, a lawsuit over this
structure resulted in a settlement requiring an agency to give the
City access to the minors in foster care so that it could provide
them with reproductive health services and education.108 Thus, the
agency itself need not educate or directly give minors in care access
to reproductive health services.109 But in 1998, the settlement was
vacated, and until 2014, “no policy [was] in place to ensure that
children placed with Catholic agencies—or any other agency for
that matter—have meaningful access to contraceptive and abortion
services.”110 In 2014, New York City’s Administration for Children
Services introduced a policy to address this issue, explicitly stating
that “provider agency staff must not impose their personal, organi-
zational, and/or religious beliefs regarding sexual and reproduc-
tive health care services on youth in foster care.”111 At this time,
102 See id.
103 See Dudley, supra note 78, at 92.
104 Id. at 94.
105 Moore, supra note 42, at 53.
106 Id.




111 City of N.Y. Admin. for Children Servs., Sexual and Reproductive Health Care for
Youth in Foster Care, Policy and Procedure #2014/9, 13 (on file with CUNY Law
Review).
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however, the implementation, enforcement, and formal legal chal-
lenges to the policy have yet to be seen.
But even when adequate policies are in place, the onus is
often on the pregnant minor to find resources and navigate barri-
ers without help.112 Formal rights to abortion and adequate educa-
tion are essentially meaningless if a minor does not have a way to
effectuate those rights and put her knowledge into action. Indeed,
all minors must navigate various barriers to receive services, and
they often are unsuccessful.113 In addition to parental-involvement
laws discussed at length below, a minor may face various laws and
regulations designed to restrict access to abortion, including wait-
ing periods, traveling long distances, or undergoing unwarranted
and excessive medical examinations and procedures, to name a
few.114 For foster care youth, these impediments may be more pro-
nounced given agencies’ failure to provide adequate sex and repro-
ductive health education, and lack of guidance and resources.115
Moreover, despite having significantly higher rates of preg-
nancy than their peers,116 foster care youth have lower rates of
abortion because barriers to abortion services are “compounded by
poverty and Medicaid provisions.”117 The average cost for a first-
trimester procedure in 2009 was $470.00,118 and for foster care
youth, who rely on the state for health care services, funds for abor-
tion are often non-existent.119 Though ninety-nine percent of fos-
ter children are eligible for Medicaid, foster care youth do not get
needed care in general.120 Making matters worse, the Hyde
Amendment prevents federal funds from being used for abortion
services, except in cases of rape, incest, or to save the person’s
112 Moore, supra note 42, at 53–54.
113 See id. at 41.
114 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2012 State
Policy Review (2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/
2012/statetrends42012.html.
115 As compared to their peers, minors in foster care might not have access to trans-
portation or may have trouble finding services on their own because of a lack of access
to information streams like the internet or school. Moore, supra note 42, at 41 (also
noting that foster youth are particularly susceptible to deceptive anti-choice medical
office fronts).
116 Dudley, supra note 78, at 80 (noting that foster care youth are 2.5 times more
likely to get pregnant than their peers).
117 Moore, supra note 42, at 41.
118 R.K. Jones & K. Kooistra, Abortion Incidence and Access To Services In The United
States, 43 n.1 PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH, 41–50 (2011),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/psrh/full/4304111.pdf.
119 See Moore, supra note 42, at 47–50 (discussing the lack of funding for abortion
available to low-income persons who rely on state programs).
120 Moore, supra note 42, at 37–38.
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life.121
Thus, to receive adequate reproductive health care, foster
youth must rely on state funding, which varies by state.122 Disturb-
ingly, only seventeen states currently fund all abortions or those
deemed medically necessary.123 Such limited funding for abortion
has wide-reaching adverse effects on a young person’s life, mater-
nal and fetal health,124 and families in general. Without such
funds, a minor in foster care has no realistic ability to terminate
her pregnancy, regardless of right, need, or desire.125
III. TERMINATING A PREGNANCY: FOSTER YOUTH’S
RIGHTS AND RESTRICTIONS
A. Background of the Legal Landscape of Abortion
Moving from pre-pregnancy sex education and lack of access
to resources for foster youth, this section will discuss the legal pos-
sibilities a pregnant foster might face when she seeks to terminate
her pregnancy. In the 1973 landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the U.S. Constitution protects a woman’s
right to privacy when she seeks to terminate her pregnancy.126 The
Court found that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment
forbids a state from completely denying a person an abortion.127
However, the Court also held that the state has a legitimate interest
in protecting the health of pregnant persons and their
pregnancies, an interest that increases along the trimester frame-
work.128 Thus, a person has a qualified right to abortion—one that
121 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3006A; Moore, supra note 42, at 49.
122 Over half of abortions are paid out of pocket because of lack of insurance. Char-
acteristics of U.S. Abortion Patients, 2008, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (May 2010), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/US-Abortion-Patients.pdf.
123 Id.; State Policies in Brief as of November 1, 2013, State Funding of Abortion Under
Medicaid, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf.
124 Jon F. Merz et al., A Review of Abortion Policy: Legality, Medicaid Funding, and Paren-
tal Involvement, 1967-1994, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 2 (1995) (“Perhaps because
women are carrying to term children who are unwanted and because such women
may be less likely to get proper prenatal care - placing them and their fetuses at in-
creased risk (but which may not qualify them for financial assistance, even if an abor-
tion is medically indicated) - restrictive Medicaid funding has been found to be
associated with lower birth weights and increased neonatal mortality.”).
125 Moore, supra note 42, at 41 (noting limited funding and programs that exist to
help low-income women obtain abortion services who would otherwise be unable to
do so).
126 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 150.
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can be curtailed by the state to further maternal and fetal health as
the state determines it.
The political reaction to Roe was enormous, creating a progeny
of state laws and cases that scaled back the breadth and force of the
right originally announced in Roe.129 Decided in 1992, one such
case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, reaffirms the major holding of Roe
but redefines how a state can curb a person’s right to abortion.130
Casey bars a state from placing an undue interference on “a wo-
man’s right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability,”
because the state’s interest in the previability pregnancy is not suffi-
cient to prohibit or impose “substantial obstacles” on a person’s
choice to terminate her pregnancy.131 Yet Casey notes the state’s
interest in maternal and fetal health from the outset of the preg-
nancy and gives the state power to restrict abortions after viability,
as long as there are exceptions for circumstances where prohibit-
ing an abortion would endanger the life or health of the pregnant
person.132 Ultimately, the Casey plurality opines that a law is invalid
if it creates an undue burden that creates a “substantial obstacle to
the woman’s effective right to elect the [abortion] procedure.”133
Applying this “undue burden” test in Gonzales v. Carhart, the
Court upheld a federal law that criminalizes doctors who perform
late term abortions through a procedure known as intact dilation
and extraction.134 Though Gonzales recognizes there is uncertainty
on whether banning the procedure creates health risks to women,
the Court held that “medical uncertainty does not foreclose the
exercise of legislative power in the abortion context,” especially
when alternatives to the procedure are available.135 The state has
“wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical
and scientific uncertainty” and should be left to its own devices to
balance risks without judicial interference.136 In Gonzales’s wake, it
129 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 224-235 (2005).
130 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833-
834 (1992); Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa Baird, Con Law Is As Con Law Does: A Survey
of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971,
977-978 (1995).
131 Casey, 505 U.S. at 834.
132 Id. (adding “[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of the preg-
nancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may be-
come a child,” and confirming the “State’s power to restrict abortions after viability, if
the law contains exceptions for pregnancies endangering a woman’s life or
health . . .).
133 Id. at 846.
134 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 125 (2007).
135 Id. at 164.
136 Id. at 163.
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is unclear what constitutes an “undue burden” on a person’s legal
ability to choose an abortion. Indeed, many laws that significantly
foreclose access to and criminalize abortion have been found
constitutional.137
B. Judicial Bypass: Preventing Minors from Access to Abortion
For better or worse, politics has placed the Court at the center of the debate
about pregnant teens. Legislatures have proven themselves incapable of
separating public health concerns from more ideological battles over the
issue of abortion.138
In the aftermath of Roe, there “was a rush by opponents of
abortion to the legislatures to enact laws placing as many road-
blocks to abortion as possible.”139 This resulted in a plethora of
laws across the states that inject parents into a minor’s decision to
obtain reproductive health services. Despite the prevalence of
these laws, the Supreme Court has only addressed the rights of
pregnant minors, or lack thereof, ten times since Roe, which is si-
lent on the issue of minors and abortion.140
In the cases that follow Roe, the Court has held that a state
cannot “give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto”
over a minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.141 However,
the Court did not leave state legislatures empty-handed in their
ability to interject parents into youth decision-making. Bellotti v.
Baird provides a solution for a state to make parental notification
and consent laws constitutional: a state must give certain categories
of minors a judicial bypass from the parental notification and con-
sent requirements.142 Under Bellotti, a law is constitutional if the
minor can petition a judge to determine whether she is sufficiently
mature and informed about the abortion procedure or that it is in
her best interest to bypass the parental notification or consent re-
quirements of the law.143 Additionally, the bypass procedure must
137 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v. Gregory
Abbott, Attorney Gen. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 506, 508 (2013) (failing to vacate a stay on
a lower federal court’s decision to uphold a Texas law, requiring a physician perform-
ing an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles which
forced “women who were planning to receive abortions . . . to go elsewhere—in some
cases 100 or more—to obtain a safe abortion, or else not to obtain one at all.”)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
138 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 129, at 235.
139 Id. at 218.
140 Id. at 213-216.
141 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
142 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-644 (1979).
143 Id. at 643-44 (“A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either:
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“be completed with anonymity” and give sufficient time for the mi-
nor to obtain a legal abortion.144
In accordance with Bellotti’s guidance, states adapted their by-
pass schemes, with most failing to define ‘sufficiently mature’ or
‘best interest of the minor’—this is left to the judge, ideally func-
tioning as an independent decision-maker.145 Throughout the pro-
cess, the burden is on the pregnant minor to seek the bypass and
then prove she is sufficiently mature or that it is in her best inter-
ests to receive the bypass.146 Despite Bellotti’s promise that the pro-
cess be expedited, the Supreme Court later held that a bypass
procedure that takes almost three weeks to complete is constitu-
tional.147 Indeed, legal challenges to the Bellotti framework have
been generally unsuccessful, except under some state constitutions
that afford greater protections for a minor’s right to privacy and
medical decision-making than the Supreme Court has found in the
federal constitution.148
Of course, it is up to each state to determine the confines of
their parental involvement and bypass laws,149 which can often en-
(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion deci-
sion, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2)
that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion
would be in her best interests . . . In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provi-
sion requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the ‘absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto’ that was found impermissible in Danforth.”).
144 Id. at 644.
145 Id. at 651.
146 See Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Mis-
use of the Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409 (2009).
147 The three-week time frame is particularly alarming given that many persons may
not realize they are pregnant until later in their pregnancy, compounded with the
shortening time periods during which a person may obtain a legal abortion. Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
148 Arguments that the bypass procedure violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment have been unsuccessful. Courts have consistently rejected the
argument that judicial bypass procedures to the parental consent law place an undue
burden on minors seeking abortion services in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
Some state constitutions do provide relief, affording greater protections for the mi-
nor’s right to privacy. See, e.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989); Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); cf. Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice,
716 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1998). But even at the state level, challenges regarding the
vagueness of statutes concerning who is emancipated and not subject to the law, as
well as who constitutes a parent for the purposes of the statute, have been met with
varying success. 77 A.L.R.5th 1 (originally published in 2000).
149 For example, states can require one or both parents to be involved, and can
require consent or notification. State Policies in Brief as of October 1, 2014 An Overview of
Minors’ Consent Law, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, (Oct. 1, 2014), available at http://
www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OMCL.pdf; State Policies in Brief as of Oc-
tober 1, 2014 Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Oct. 1,
2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PIMA.pdf.
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compass access to other reproductive health services such as con-
traception.150 To date, only two states and the District of Columbia
explicitly give a minor the affirmative right to consent to an abor-
tion,151 while thirty-nine states require parental involvement in the
decision-making process,152 eight of which go so far as to require
the parental consent to be notarized before allowing a minor ac-
cess to reproductive health services.153
Additionally, some states have adopted a heightened standard
of “clear and convincing” evidence for judicial bypass proceedings,
making it all the more difficult for a minor to prove her maturity
with arbitrarily-related evidence, such as high school grades, work
experience, or anything else an individual judge might find, or not
find, sufficient.154 Indeed, the judicial bypass procedure can be a
difficult experience for a minor, placing the burden on her to
prove her maturity and that she is well-informed about the proce-
dure in a court of law, all with the knowledge that if she fails, she
may have to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.155 In addition
to this stress, the wide discretion left to an individual judge can
create space for bias and exposes the minor to humiliation.156
For example, in Anonymous 5, the presiding judge had previ-
ously served on a committee of a very active Nebraska anti-abortion
group.157 Such political affiliations and hostility towards abortion
beamed bright when he questioned the minor in open court, ask-
ing whether she would “kill the child inside [her rather] than risk
problems with the foster care people,”158 an inquiry that the Ne-
braska Supreme Court found permissible on appeal.159
Judges’ wide discretion not only allows questionable inquiries
riddled with bias and pre-judgment, but can also make the whole
process futile.160 Indeed, for some judges, “all minors who would
150 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Minors’ Consent Law, supra note 149 (discussing consent
laws for various other reproductive health services, including for minors to access
contraceptive services, STI services, prenatal care, and adoption).
151 Id.
152 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, supra note 149.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Moore, supra note 40, at 46.
156 Id.; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 129, at 242–243; Sanger, supra note 146, at 492-493.
157 Chidi, supra note 1.
158 In re Petition of Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Neb. 2013).
159 Id.
160 Sanger, supra note 146, at 492-493 (“Judicial opposition to abortion has also
colored how these hearings are conducted. Judges have questioned petitioners as
though abortion’s legality was unresolved, as though the only measure of a peti-
tioner’s maturity was the decision not to abort, and as though the hearing offered a
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use the bypass procedure are by definition immature,”161 and there
have been multiple reports of “anti-abortion judges using the by-
pass process to harass the girls who come before them.”162 Advo-
cates report judges “torment[ing] pregnant minors in their
courtroom” by requiring minors to undergo unscientific anti-abor-
tion education, “assign[ing] anti-abortion lawyers to represent
them in court,” or even appointing a lawyer for the fetus.163 When
a judge’s private feelings on abortion inundate the courtroom and
the proceedings, he is far from the neutral decision-maker
imagined in Bellotti,164 but unfortunately this is all too common
among bypass proceedings.165
But even with an impartial judge on the bench, the process
can produce humiliation, confusion, and harm a person’s dig-
nity.166 Testifying for a challenge to Minnesota’s parental consent
law, one judge said that a minor’s level of apprehension during the
bypass proceeding is twice what he saw during other proceedings—
“You see all the typical things that you would see with somebody
under incredible amounts of stress, answering monosyllabically,
tone of voice, tenor of voice, shaky, wringing of hands, you
know, one young lady had her—her hands were turning blue
and it was warm in my office.”167
Another family court judge testified that going to court alone “was
‘absolutely’ traumatic for minors. ‘You know, it was just—it was just
another thing at a very, very difficult time in their lives.’”168
Yet, as noted, the framework in Bellotti puts the burden en-
tirely on the minor and gives her no support, leaving her to rebut
the presumption that she is too immature and it is not in her best
interest to receive the bypass. But how is she to prove she is ma-
ture? Most likely she will offer evidence of her high school grades,
chance to remonstrate against it. They have asked petitioning minors whether they
understand that abortion is murder, whether they would kill their own three-year-old
child, whether they change their mind about abortion if they knew their baby would
go to a loving adoptive family or if they were given $2000. Bypass denials have been
sprinkled with pro-life sentiment: ‘This is a capital case. It involves the question
whether [the minor’s] unborn child should live or die.’ And some judges refuse to
hear bypass cases at all.”).
161 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 129, at 242.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 242–243.
164 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
165 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 129, at 242–243; Sanger, supra note 146, at 492-493.
166 See Sanger, supra note 146, at 484-486; Moore, supra note 42, at 46.
167 Hodgson v. State of Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766 (D. Minn. 1986) (testi-
mony of Honorable William Sweeney).
168 Id. (testimony of Mr. Paul Garrity, former Massachusetts judge).
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work experience, how she articulates herself, or her knowledge
about the procedure, but the judge is ultimately left to find con-
nections between these questionably relevant facts and what he
deems mature or immature. Although proving maturity in court
may be empowering for some young people, the arbitrary process
creates yet another barrier that hampers a young person from exer-
cising autonomy over her body, from having control over her own
medical decision-making and reproductive freedom.
C. Judicial Bypass and Foster Youth: Exceptions, Legal Quandaries,
and Risk of Harm
In Bellotti, the Court recognized the risk of leaving the abor-
tion decision outside the hands of the pregnant minor, but this
concern was ultimately outweighed by conveniently placed paren-
tal rights rhetoric, pitting a minor’s right against that of her par-
ents.169 This resulted in a process that removes the private medical
decision from the minor and her physician, and places it in the
hands of a judge or the minor’s parent.170 In doing so, the judicial
bypass procedure created by Bellotti does little to avoid risks for the
minor’s well being, but instead often engenders serious problems
for a minor’s health and safety.171
This is especially true for a minor in foster care, whose rela-
tionship with her parents might be broken because of unnecessary
state intervention or otherwise. In deriving a constitutional frame-
work from an imagined world of the ideal parent-child relation-
ship, the Court created quandaries for minors whose family
structures do not meet the contours of the law, yet are still bound
by them (e.g., minors in foster care who do not have parents to
seek consent from).172 The framework also creates real risks of
harm for minors whose parental relationships do not meet the ide-
169 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639-645; see also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 129.
170 Moore, supra note 42, at 45 (discussing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643).
171 Id. at 46.
172 Id. at 57 (“There are many categories of girls for whom parental notification or
consent laws simply do not fit. Foster girls . . . are one such group. Other groups of
girls include, but are by no means limited to, those who have never met one of their
parents, girls whose parent(s) are incarcerated in prison or held in a mental health
facility or rehabilitation center, girls who do not wish to be in contact with a parent
because of sexual or physical abuse, and girls who do not know where one or both
parents live. It is not uncommon for girls in such situations to still live under the legal
guardianship of such parents, even when they are unavailable, cannot be found, or
pose a physical or psychological risk to their daughter. Such girls are stuck when
courts refuse to be flexible in interpreting parental notification and consent
statutes.”).
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als imagined in Bellotti (e.g., when the minor’s father might also be
the putative father of her pregnancy).173 The minor is then left
with the onus to prove her maturity in an infantilizing and arbi-
trary process, which presumes her to be immature and non-autono-
mous from the start.
Mindful that the Bellotti structure can be dangerous to youth,
sixteen states have exceptions to parental consent laws for minors
who are abused or neglected.174 Yet the exception is often un-
helpful to protect minors put at risk by the bypass procedure be-
cause it is narrowly applied and courts often require a nexus
between the person who must consent and the finding of abuse.175
For example, the Nebraska law at issue in Anonymous 5 pro-
vides an exception from parental consent if the minor is adjudi-
cated abused or neglected within the meaning of Nebraska’s child
protection law.176 The minor was in state custody pursuant to the
state’s abuse and neglect law and her biological parents’ formal
legal rights had been terminated two years earlier.177 However, the
court found that she did not meet the exception because in order
to meet the abuse or neglect exception, “the pregnant woman
must establish that a parent or guardian, who fills that role at the
time she files her petition, has abused or neglected her.”178
Under these narrow nexus requirements, a minor who suffers
trauma will often not meet the exception. A minor’s abuse or neg-
lect will not be sufficient for the exception if someone other than
her parents abused her, including when a pregnancy is a result of
the abuse, or if the abuse is ongoing. Additionally, the burden is on
the minor to prove that she is or has been a victim of abuse in
court,179 an experience that can re-victimize the minor and prevent
her from exercising her legal rights to terminate her pregnancy.
In the remaining thirty-four states without the exception, a de-
173 Id.
174 GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, supra note 149.
175 Ohio v. Akron, 497 U.S. 507, 519-520 (1990) (finding no undue burden for a
minor in judicial bypass proceedings when the minor could prove maturity, that she
was a victim of abuse, or that it was in her best interests to have the bypass); see also In
re Petition of Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d 226, 232 (Neb. 2013). The exception does
not apply in circumstances where a minor is in state custody, but a court finding of
abuse or neglect has not yet been made, which can often take years to decide because
of over-burdened courts and the failings of ASFA.
176 See Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d at 232.
177 Id. at 231.
178 Id. at 233.
179 See, e.g., id. (“Petitioner did not meet her burden to show that she is a victim of
such abuse or neglect.”).
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nial of the bypass requires the foster youth to receive her parents’
consent or notify them if their rights have not been formally termi-
nated.180 When parental rights have been legally terminated or sig-
nificantly hampered, however, it is ambiguous whether the
agencies’ or foster parents’ consent is required,181 because of the
“diffusion of authority and responsibility among parents,” agencies,
and the state.182
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided that foster parents
do not have the same rights as natural birth parents and cannot
consent to most medical procedures for youth without agency ap-
proval—yet in the abortion context with parental consent laws, it
seems a foster parent’s consent is required for foster youth.183 In
Anonymous 5, the dissenting justices recognize this problem,
“The petitioner has no legal parents; the juvenile court termi-
nated their parental rights. Her legal guardian, the Depart-
ment—by regulation—will not give her consent. And although
the district court has required her to get her foster parents’ con-
sent to obtain an abortion, their consent would be meaningless
under the law because they are neither parents nor guardians.
She is in a legal limbo—a quandary of the Legislature’s
making.”184
Equally problematic is requiring an agency’s consent because polit-
ical pressures may dictate action, or in some cases, inaction—effec-
180 See, e.g., In re P.R., 497 N.E.2d 1070 (Ind. 1986) (finding that a child being re-
manded to state care did not obviate the natural mother’s consent as required by state
statute).
181 See, e.g., In re T.H., 484 N.E.2d 568, 569 (Ind. 1985) (finding a minor required
the Director of the Department of Public Welfare’s consent to receive an abortion,
rather than the foster parents with whom the minor was placed. The Director refused
consent; instead, “they would handle all arrangements for her, including placement
for adoption.”).
182 See Moore, supra note 42, at 44, 57; See generally Addressing Barriers, AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, HEALTH FOSTER CARE AMERICA (2013), http://www.aap.org/
en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/healthy-foster-care-america/Pages/
Addressing-Barriers.aspx#sthash.QMQtEN1h.dpuf.
183 Foster parents also often need agency permission to immunize a youth and only
may obtain routine medical care for foster youth. See, Smith v. Org. of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 828 n.20 (1977) (“[A]though the agency usu-
ally obtains legal custody in foster family care, the child still legally ‘belongs’ to the
parent and the parent retains guardianship. This means that, for some crucial aspects
of the child’s life, the agency has no authority to act. Only the parent can consent to
surgery for the child, or consent to his marriage, or permit his enlistment in the
armed forces, or represent him at law”); see, e.g., In re Petition of Anonymous 5, 838
N.W.2d 226, 239-240 (Neb. 2013) (“The Department authorizes foster parents to ob-
tain only routine immunizations and medical care for a foster child, under a
caseworker’s supervision and direction.”). See also
184 Anonymous 5, 838 N.W.2d at 238.
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tively denying a minor an abortion by withholding consent as in
Anonymous 5. Moreover, when a child is placed with a private
agency, whose religious ideology opposes abortion, refusing con-
sent becomes significantly poignant for religious freedom consider-
ations. Of final note, and perhaps highlighting the legal absurdity
of parental consent laws, a legal conundrum arises when a parent-
ing foster minor is able to consent to her child’s medical proce-
dures, but not to her own abortion.185
Regardless of the legal quandaries, practical safety concerns
for youth also trouble the wisdom of parental consent laws: forcing
a minor to tell adults whom she otherwise feels uncomfortable tell-
ing about her pregnancy, or her desires to terminate it, exposes
her to risks of verbal assault, physical violence, and homeless-
ness.186 For a foster minor, an agency or foster placement’s disap-
proval of her sexuality, sexual activity, pregnancy, or desire for an
abortion may heighten risks of homelessness and instability.187
Privacy around pregnancy is vital for youth; yet judicial bypass
hearings place a minor at risk of public exposure, which can have
severe consequences for a foster youth’s well being and the stability
of her placement.188 Anonymity may be easily compromised in ar-
eas where the community is insular and foster placements are in
greater shortage, but for all minors, anonymity is difficult to
achieve when she enters a public courtroom known for bypass
hearings. Unfortunately, “foster youth frequently run away from
their placement once it is discovered that they are pregnant, and
finding them is often difficult.”189 By placing their pregnancies in
public view, bypass laws increase a risk of homelessness and lack of
resources for pregnant minors in foster care.
185 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 15.
186 Moore, supra note 42, at 45 (“There can be significant problems for minors who
desire to obtain an abortion in states that require parental consent or notification.
Girls may face verbal or physical abuse if they tell a parent about their pregnancy or
their desire for an abortion, and many girls risk being kicked out of their homes if
they come home pregnant”); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW
COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS 13 (2007) (“[T]he AMA has concluded that some
minors would experience serious physical and emotional injury under a blanket pa-
rental involvement provision”); Miriam Gerace, Should Doctors Have to Notify Parents
Before a Minor Receives an Abortion?, L.A. TIMES (October 22, 2008), http://
www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-gerace-short22-2008oct22,0,7048163.story
(“There is a significant risk of violence, abuse and rejection in families when parents
are informed of a pregnancy.”).
187 The risk of homelessness is increased for older minors or minors wishing to
carry the pregnancy to term, because of lack of alternative or accommodating place-
ments. Moore, supra note 42, at 47.
188 Id.
189 Dworsky & DeCoursey, supra note 12, at 38.
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IV. MINOR PARENTS IN FOSTER CARE: THE RISK OF
LOSING A CHILD
With such large barriers to autonomous decision-making in
becoming pregnant or terminating a pregnancy, foster youth also
face serious injustice when they remain pregnant and give birth in
state care. Though there is currently no national tracking of preg-
nancy and parenting rates of youth in foster care, it is undisputed
that pregnant and parenting minors make up a significant portion
of the foster youth population.190 This is not surprising considering
foster youth’s higher pregnancy rate, lower rate of abortion, and
increased chances of repeat pregnancy than their non-foster
peers.191 A report from the New York City Public Advocate esti-
mates that one in six girls in foster care are either pregnant or
parenting.192 Yet despite these high, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, known numbers, child welfare systems continue to fail to
provide support and health services to minors who wish to carry
pregnancies to term and parent their children.
Though special placements sometimes exist for some foster
care youth who want to carry their pregnancies to term, the space
is severely limited and often requires youth to be moved from their
current placement, increasing instability for the minor.193 Preg-
nant foster youth are also at risk for running away or being ex-
pelled from their placements, especially because placements
typically do not receive additional funds for housing pregnant or
parenting minors.194
Of significant concern is that across the board, pregnant foster
youth do not receive adequate prenatal care or health screen-
190 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 15, at 5-6.
191 Dworsky & DeCoursey, supra note 12, at 33.
192 Jill E. Sheppard, Mark A. Woltman The Public Advocate for the City of New
York, The Public Advocate for the City of New York, Children Raising Children: City Fails to
Adequately Assist Pregnant and Parenting Youth in Foster Care 7 (May 2005), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/govpub/2708children_raising_children.pdf.
193 Moore, supra note 42, at 60-61; Dworsky & DeCoursey, supra note 12, at 40 (“In-
terviewees also noted that there is a shortage of group homes for parenting wards.
Currently, these youth must wait 3 to 4 months to be placed.”).
194 Dworsky & DeCoursey, supra note 12, at 40 (“Interviewees pointed out that rela-
tively few TPSN clients live in traditional foster homes and suggested that one reason
for this situation may be that foster parents are reluctant to accept pregnant and
parenting youth for whom the board rate is no higher. They recommended catego-
rizing pregnant or parenting youth as needing ‘specialized’ care, which in turn would
make their foster parents eligible for higher board rates. Interviewees also noted that
there is a shortage of group homes for parenting wards. Currently, these youth must
wait 3 to 4 months to be placed.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-1\CNY104.txt unknown Seq: 29 30-APR-15 15:04
2014] NO ACCESS, NO CHOICE 147
ings.195 One study in Washington State found that pregnant foster
youth’s birth outcomes are far worse than those of their peers—
foster youth have the highest rate of premature births, low birth
weights, and infant mortality because of various factors, including
poverty and lack of resources for medical and mental health
care.196
Most disturbing, when a foster youth does successfully carry a
pregnancy to term, she faces a significant risk that her child will be
immediately removed from care due to increased scrutiny from
child protective services and lack of resources provided to her to
parent her child.197 Compared to their peers, parents in foster care
are much more likely to become subjects of state investigation and
have their children removed from them.198 In the Washington
State study, not only were the rates of referrals to child welfare spe-
cialists ten times higher for foster youth, but horrifyingly children
of parenting foster youth were placed in stranger foster care at a
rate nearly twenty-five times higher than parenting youth not rely-
ing on government resources.199
The circumstances of the removal of foster youth’s children
are often caused by a failure of the state to provide resources for
newly parenting wards in their care.200 Additionally, higher rates of
removal from foster youth are the result of a foster youth being
subject to intense scrutiny by child welfare agencies by virtue of
being their wards. Suspicious caseworkers and foster parents may
view a new mother as damaged, disturbed, or unable to parent be-
cause of her own placement in care, rather than because of actual
concerns of neglect or abuse—
195 Id. at 38; WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., supra note 12, at 10
(“Foster Youth had the lowest rates of first trimester entry into prenatal care; the rates
of first trimester prenatal care were similar for those whose stay in foster care include
the prenatal period and for those who entered foster care at the end of pregnancy or
later.”).
196 WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., supra note 12 at 7-8 (“Foster Youth
had the highest rate of premature births, with sixteen percent  of their babies born
before 37 weeks gestational age.” “Foster Youth had the highest rate of low birth
weight, with eight percent of their babies born at less than 5.5 pounds.” “16.6 per
1000 of [foster youth’s] liveborn infants died before their first birthday.”).
197 See, e.g., Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 15, at 24; Dworsky & DeCoursey, supra
note 12, at 34.
198 Dworsky & DeCoursey, supra note 12, at 34. (“Twenty-two percent of the TPSN
mothers were investigated for child abuse or neglect and 11 percent had a child
placed in foster care. Most of their children were very young when they were placed,
and while some of their placements were very short-term, many had not achieved
permanency even after 2 years.”).
199 WASH. ST. DEP’T OF SOC. AND HEALTH SERVS, supra note 12, at 9-10.
200 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 15, at 61.
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“Advocates across the country report that states and counties fre-
quently violate parenting wards’ due process rights by coercing
teens into ‘voluntarily’ placing their child in government cus-
tody, separating wards from their children absent proper judi-
cial findings, and threatening to remove infants from the ward’s
care based on infractions which do not pose an imminent risk of
harm to the baby.”201
Indeed, parenting youth are penalized with the removal of their
children because of a lack of resources and access to necessary ser-
vices that the state has failed to provide, despite being responsible
for the health and well-being of youth entrusted to its care.202
For example, New York State law mandates that child welfare
departments provide “financial support to minor parents in foster
care, personal counseling and support services to ensure stability,
and assistance in achieving the highest possible degree of eco-
nomic independence.”203 But a study done by the City’s Public Ad-
vocate found that in every area, there were alarming insufficiencies
in needed services to support pregnant and parenting foster
youth.204 These insufficiencies were primarily responsible for in-
creased rates of neglect and abuse findings against parenting foster
youth and the removal of their children.205
Additionally, when a minor is charged with abuse or neglect,
the state acts both as prosecutor and caretaker of its wards—a ludi-
crous contradiction.206 The parenting minor’s attorney may also
face a conflict of interest. Indeed, “many organizations represent-
ing children see the representation of parents—even minor par-
ents—as conflicting with the fundamental mission of their
agency.”207
This is an absurd and destructive result of the unnecessary ad-
versarial process of current child welfare law—the state prosecutes
the parent with the goal of finding abuse or neglect, rather than
acting in the family’s best interest.208 Children’s rights are unneces-
sarily pitted against parents’ rights, a mechanism that harms all
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 BETSY GOTBAUM, JILL E. SHEPPARD, MARK A. WOLTMAN, THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE
FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CHILDREN RAISING CHILDREN: CITY FAILS TO ADEQUATELY
ASSIST PREGNANT AND PARENTING YOUTH IN FOSTERCARE 4 (2005), http://www.nyc
.gov/html/records/pdf/govpub/2708children_raising_children.pdf.
204 Id. at 7-8.
205 See id.
206 Stotland & Godsoe, supra note 15, at 42–43.
207 Id. at 32.
208 Id. at 42–46; see generally, GUGGENHEIM, supra note 129.
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members of the family unit because children’s and parents’ inter-
ests are typically aligned, and the majority of children are better off
when they remain with their parents.209
V. A BETTER SYSTEM: CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND NEW PREMISES
States entrusted with the health of foster youth fail, repeatedly
and on all counts. First, necessary sex and reproductive health edu-
cation and resources to prevent pregnancy are not provided. After
pregnancy occurs, the state erects barriers to deny a minor the le-
gal right and resources she needs to terminate her pregnancy. Af-
ter not receiving adequate health care and support while pregnant,
she likely will then give birth without access to needed resources
and support to parent her child, which often results in the unwar-
ranted and destructive state removal of her child.
Given the evidence that the state severely fails to meet the
health and educational needs of foster youth, a plethora of
changes must be implemented to significantly improve outcomes
for foster care youth. Better data collection to assess the needs of
pregnant and parenting foster youth,210 adequate training for
caseworkers and foster parents,211 privileging and supporting kin-
ship care,212 treating foster youth as emancipated for the purpose
of bypass procedures,213 reducing crossover with the juvenile jus-
tice system,214 and other various concrete suggestions exist to ad-
dress the myriad of problems facing foster youth.215 Yet, despite a
laundry list of concrete suggestions from advocates, researchers,
and policy makers, these fixable problems remain persistent and
209 Emma Ketteringham, Test and Report: Bad for Children and Families, HUFFINGTON
POST (April 25, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emma-s-ketteringham/test-
and-report-bad-for-children-and-families_b_5175106.html (“Former foster children
are far more likely to drop out of school, be imprisoned, enter the homeless popula-
tion, join welfare or have substance abuse problems of their own when compared to
children similarly neglected, but who remained with their families”); Joseph Doyle,
Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Foster Care, 97(5) AM. ECON.
REV. 1583 (2007)(finding that similarly situated youth who remain with their parents
have better outcomes than those who are placed in stranger foster care); Schorr, supra
note 32, at 21 (“A compassionate response to children must include an equally com-
passionate response to their parents.”).
210 Dudley, supra note 78, at 80.
211 Baynes-Dunning & Worthington, supra note 64, at 337.
212 ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 24-25 (discussing generally the problems with and
improvements needed to be made to kinship care policies).
213 Moore, supra note 42, at 61.
214 Baynes-Dunning & Worthington, supra note 64, at 346.
215 Id.; Dudley, supra note 78; Moore, supra note 42.
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prevalent because of the system’s flawed approach to the health of
families and youth.
To engender change, child welfare law must be fundamentally
rethought and goals reframed to acknowledge current realities. Al-
though these recommendations are not an exhaustive list of the
necessary conceptual changes, our system must recognize that pov-
erty is the greatest risk to youth’s health, that youth are sexually
active, and that youth can be trusted to make autonomous deci-
sions when provided with sufficient support and education. These
are starting points to ensure that the health of youth and families
are privileged above ideology and politics.
First, the current system ignores poverty as the number one
threat to child safety, including a lack of safe housing and neces-
sary resources, such as food, education, and health care.216 Unnec-
essary and prolonged removal of children from their parents is
damaging to the continuity that children need, while “restraint in
intervention advances the child’s best interests.”217 State interven-
tions should be “to the degree necessary to ensure the child’s
safety,” yet removal is almost the first resort in many cases.218
Rather than parent-blaming, a system premised on the reali-
ties of poverty would reduce the number of harmful and unneces-
sary state interventions that are almost automatic in the current
system.219 Moving away from a complex system of caseworkers, law-
yers, and questionable privately-run court-mandated services would
allow states to focus efforts on improving access to housing, health
care, and necessities.220 In doing so, states could truly protect chil-
dren and families, providing them with the support necessary for
them to maintain agency and control over their bodies and their
lives.221
216 NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, Child Poverty (last visited May 2,
2014), http://www.nccp.org/topics/childpoverty.html; see also Ketteringham, supra
note 32; ROBERTS, supra note 33, at 26-29.
217 See Crossley, supra note 22, at 266.
218 Id.
219 Ketteringham, supra note 32 (“Blaming poor parents for what are the predict-
able consequences of poverty is not just unfair. It allows the rest of us to ignore that
economic inequality led to the tragedy. It permits state officials to appear to be help-
ing to keep children safe, while ignoring the well-understood threats to our children’s
well-being, such as unsafe housing, dangerous neighborhoods, and the other deficits
in poor communities which poor children routinely are forced to endure—such as
having to light candles to avoid living in a dark apartment.”).
220 It is not practically possible to charge the state bureaucracies, and private agen-
cies, to take on the responsibility of raising whole communities of children. GUGGEN-
HEIM, supra note 129, at 248;
221 Ketteringham, supra note 32 (“Instead of paying tens of thousands of dollars to
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\18-1\CNY104.txt unknown Seq: 33 30-APR-15 15:04
2014] NO ACCESS, NO CHOICE 151
Second, legislatures, judges, and other adults who are in mi-
nors’ lives as workers or family need to accept that minors have sex.
Avoidance of sex education and reliance on abstinence-only mod-
els neither delays sexual activity nor reduces the number of sex
partners one has nor lowers sexually transmitted infections and
pregnancy rates.222 In addition to denying the reality that youth
have sex, such policies frame sex as shameful and wrong, exacer-
bating the difficulties that youth already have when approaching
resources to ask questions or ask for help.223 Indeed, minors have
sex whether they receive sex education or not.  Deplorably many
policies fail to recognize the fact that teens are sexually active re-
gardless of their level of sex education.  Such inadequate policies
remain in place at the expense of health, and affected youth are
left without the tools needed to protect their health and make in-
formed decisions about their bodies.224
The state must protect the health and safety of youth by re-
quiring and implementing effective comprehensive sex education.
Comprehensive sex education does not encourage or sanction teen
sex, and research shows that youth who receive such education do
not have more sex than those who receive ineffective abstinence-
only education.225 Youth who receive sex education are also health-
ier and safer when they do engage in sexual behaviors.226 Impor-
tantly, adequate education requires not only teaching youth their
rights but also how to access resources to effectuate those rights.
With a system premised on the fact that youth are sexually active,
policies can be implemented to give youth the education needed
to support their autonomy and protect their short-term and long-
term health.
Third, youth need a system that trusts them rather than infan-
tilizes them. From parental consent laws to intensified scrutiny of
parenting foster youth, the current legal system is predicated on
involve dozens of caseworkers and lawyers in the family’s lives, New York City could be
footing the bills that might really help: access to safe housing and assistance with the
utility bill.”).
222 ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH, Comprehensive Sex Education: Research and Results
(2009), available at http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/storage/advfy/documents/
fscse.pdf (“no abstinence-only program has yet been proven through rigorous evalua-
tion to help youth delay sex for a significant period of time, help youth decrease their
number of sex partners, or reduce STI or pregnancy rates among teens.”); ADVOCATES
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youth having a lack of autonomy. However, if youth are given edu-
cation and adequate support, youth can be and should be en-
trusted with the decisions that will determine their lives and
reproductive health.
Putting policies in place that require an agency to provide re-
sources and promote access will free minors like Anonymous 5
from the legal limbo that leaves them parentless, pregnant, and in
poverty, lacking needed resources and support to make meaning-
ful choices about the future.  Unfortunately, as advocates and com-
mentators have documented, agencies and policy makers often
allow political pressures, or desire to avoid divisive topics, to trump
giving youth education and resources to make autonomous deci-
sions about their lives.227
In doing so, the health and well-being of foster youth suffer at
the hands of those who are charged with providing for youth, rein-
forcing systems of poverty and violence that plague and punish im-
poverished communities. With a system whose goal is to secure
autonomy for youth, through education, support, and access to re-
sources, youth can be empowered to make informed decisions
about their own bodies and secure reproductive justice.
CONCLUSION
The United States is in a crisis when it comes to child wel-
fare—it has created a system that punishes impoverished commu-
nities and sets up youth in foster care to fail. In particular, foster
youth are given inadequate access to services, education, and sup-
port to exercise reproductive decision-making. They are then
robbed of the chance to actually parent their own children. With
fundamental changes in the premises of the child welfare system—
1) recognizing poverty as the major risk to health, 2) accepting
that youth are sexually active, and 3) empowering youth through
education and access to resources—the system can better achieve
its goals: providing for and promoting the health and wellbeing of
families and their children.
227 Dudley, supra 78, at 94–95; BRONWYN MAYDEN, SEXUALITY EDUCATION FOR
YOUTHS IN CARE 19–20 (1996) (showing that child welfare agencies make “conscious
decisions not to develop written policies” and ignore sex education out of concern
over the political ramifications).
